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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ESTATE OF: 
MARION CATHERINE HOWES, 
Decedent. 
Case No. 950133-CA 
Argument Priority No. 10 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Appeal is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant 
to UCA §78-2a-3(2)(k)(1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the trial court erred in its findings numbers 9, 10, and 38 that the 
Defendant1 held fee simple title to the property when Plaintiff failed to meet her burden 
to successfully sever or attack the joint tenancy title between Defendant and his wife. 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
In mounting a challenge to the lower court's findings, the Plaintiff in the 
instant case "must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous'." In re 
1
 Appellee will identify himself as Defendant and Appellant as Plaintiff throughout his brief 
to reflect the parties as referenced in the lower court's findings which are at issue. Plaintiff's brother, who 
chose not to appeal, will be referred to as Plaintiff Griffiths. 
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Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885,886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987)). The Plaintiff not only has the burden of marshaling all of the 
evidence in support of the findings but must establish that "those findings are so void of 
support as to be clearly erroneous." Larsen v. Larsen. 888 P.2d 719,723 (Utah App. 
1994) Citing Hagan v. Hagan. 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App.1991). The marshaling of 
evidence requires Plaintiff to cite "to all of the evidence in the record to support the 
trial court's determination and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the court below, it is insufficient to support the finding under attack." 
Interiors Contracting. Inc. v. Smith. Halander & Smith Associates. 881 P.2d 929, 933 
(Utah App. 1994) (Citations Omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an Interlocutory Appeal from the lower court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law entered on November 21, 1994. (R. 654-659) As addressed by 
the lower court's findings which are not in dispute, the Plaintiff failed to meet her 
burden to sever or attack the joint tenancy title held between Defendant and his wife to 
their home located in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The Appellant is limiting her appeal to Findings of Fact numbers 9, 10, 
and 38 where the District Court found that the home was held in the name of C. Leo 
Howes and M. Catherine Howes as joint tenants at the time of Defendant's wife's 
death; and therefore, passed by operation of law to Plaintiff. (R. 654 et seq. Findings 
of Fact #9, 10, and 38.) 
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On or about February 12, 1993, Plaintiff and her brother ("Plaintiff 
Griffiths") filed a civil suit in the District Court for Salt Lake County under Civil No. 
CV930900838. (Complaint on file in Salt Lake County District Court No. 
CV930900838.) On April 19, 1993, Plaintiffs filled a Petition for Formal Adjudication 
of Intestacy and Formal Application of Personal Representative for Decedent's Estate. 
(R. 1-14). The entire probate record contains numerous motions, objections and related 
instruments concerning probate, real property and personal property issues. (R. 16-
628). On April 21, 1993, Judge Young dismissed the civil suit, released the Lis 
Pendens that Plaintiffs had filed on the Home and entered a finding that at the time of 
Defendant's wife's death, the home was held by them as joint tenants. (R. 75-76) 
On October 25, 1993, the Plaintiff filed a "Petition to Set Aside Joint 
Tenancy and Demand That Property Not Be Sold". (R. 323-346) On November 2, 
1993, Defendant filed a "Memorandum in Opposition to Petition to Set Aside Joint 
Tenancy and Demand That Property Not Be Sold". (R. 353-358) The Plaintiff never 
filed a reply memorandum to the Opposition and on November 17, 1993, the trial court 
reserved its decision on Plaintiff's Petition to set aside the joint tenancy between 
Defendant and his wife and Defendant's opposition thereto for trial. (R. 387-389) 
The trial was held on April 26, May 11, and June 15, 1994, to address 
Plaintiff's attempt to sever or set aside the joint tenancy of the Defendant and his wife. 
(R. 664) The trial addressed only the real property issues of the probate proceeding, 
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and more particularly, Plaintiff and Plaintiff Griffiths attempt to set aside or sever the 
joint tenancy pursuant to the above referenced petition. (R. 387-389) 
On September 2, 1994, the trial court entered its memorandum decision. 
(R. 642-647) On September 30, 1994, proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment were served upon Plaintiff. (Addendum #1) On October 5, 1994, 
Petitioner filed objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment. (R. 648-651) On October 17, 1994, Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiffs' 
objections. (R. 654-659) 
On November 1, 1994 the lower court entered a minute entry directing 
Defendant to prepare revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with 
its minute entry. (R. 661-663) On November 21, 1994, the lower court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 664-675) and Judgment (R. 676-679) 
confirming the status of the recorded title that Defendant held the home as a joint tenant 
with his wife at the time of his wife's death and the fact that the Plaintiffs failed to meet 
their burden of proving otherwise. 
On December 12, 1994, Plaintiff Poulsen filed a Petition for Permission 
to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order. (Petition for Permission to Appeal from an 
Interlocutory Order on file with Court of Appeals.) Plaintiff Griffiths did not appeal 
and is not a party to this appeal. On February 16, 1995, Plaintiff's Petition for 
Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order was granted by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Home which was the subject of the trial was located at 5160 
South Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, State of Utah. (R. 323,934,665) 
2. Catherine Howes used different names during her lifetime, which 
included Marion Catherine Griffiths, Marion K. Griffiths, M. Catherine Howes, M. 
Katherine Howes, all of which refer to the Decedent. (R. 665) 
3. In June of 1978 Marion Catherine Griffiths and Clinton Leo 
Howes ("Defendant"), husband and wife, conveyed the property to Clinton Howes and 
Marion K. Griffiths as husband and wife and Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah S. 
Griffiths as husband and wife as joint tenants. (R. 666) (Addendum #2) 
4. On October 11, 1988, Clinton Howes, Mary K. Griffiths, Gregory 
J. Griffiths, and Deborah S. Griffiths conveyed the property by warranty deed to C. 
Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes. (R. 666) (Addendum #3) 
5. On March 10, 1989, C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes 
conveyed the property to themselves, M. Catherine Howes and C. Leo Howes and as 
joint tenants. (R. 17, 24, 64, 70, 76, 135, 293, 299, 326, 362, 374, 415, 642, 666, 
677, 1084, 1431, 1434, 1442, 1499, 1518, 1519, 1522, 1529, 1530, Plaintiffs Petition 
for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, Exhibit H, and Docketing 
Statement on file with the Court of Appeals) (Addendum #4) 
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6. On September 22, 1992, Catherine Howes passed away in her and 
Defendant's home located at 5160 South Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
(R. 665) 
7. At the time of Catherine Howes death, title to the property was 
held in the name of M. Catherine Howes and C. Leo Howes as joint tenants. (R.76, 
286, 293, 326, 356, 361, 368, 471, 628, 643, 659, 664, 672, 676, 677, 941, 1431, 
1434, 1436, 1437, 1458, 1518, 1519, 1522, 1530, Trial Exhibit 82, Plaintiffs Petition 
for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Motion, and Docketing Statement on 
file with the Appellate Court) 
8. At the time of Catherine Howes's death, she was married to 
Clinton Leo Howes. (R. 665) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff not only fails to marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
disputed findings but utilizes her alleged marshaling to further her arguments against the 
disputed findings. Plaintiffs spurious marshaling conveniently fails to address the fact 
that the existence, execution and recording of the deeds giving rise to the joint tenancy 
between Defendant and his wife have never been in dispute. In addition, Plaintiff 
purposely fails to address the following: 1) the evidence and testimony before the lower 
court; 2) Plaintiffs own admissions; 3) Plaintiffs prior Joint Tenancy Severance 
Motion and Defendant's opposition thereto; 4) a stipulation of the parties; and 5) 
Plaintiffs own representations to not only the lower court but to the Appellate Court 
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establishing the fact that the recorded title at the time of Defendant's wife's death was as 
joint tenants to which the home passed by operation of law to Defendant. The 
existence, execution, and recordation of the deeds in question have never been in 
dispute and the disputed findings do not even enter the realm of being in error 
particularly when viewed in a light most favorable to them. 
Plaintiff is attempting to shift her burden of severing or attacking the joint 
tenancy of Defendant and his wife and the fact that fee title to Defendant and his wife's 
home transferred to the Defendant upon his wife's death. Plaintiff and Plaintiff Griffiths 
failed to meet their burden of severing the undisputed recorded joint tenancy between 
Defendant and his wife and the fact that upon the death of his wife fee title was 
transferred by operation of law solely to the Defendant. 
Plaintiffs attempt to dispute the deed establishing title as referenced in 
her brief raises new issues at the appellate level that she never disputed, raised before 
the trial court, preserved for appeal, or raised in her prior documents filed on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE FINDINGS AND DEMONSTRATE HOW THE EVIDENCE, 
WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE FINDINGS, WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE DISPUTED FINDINGS. 
7 
Plaintiff must establish that the disputed findings of the Court were clearly 
erroneous through a marshaling of all evidence contained in the record on appeal. Alta 
Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282,1286 (Utah 1993). The marshaling of evidence 
requires the Plaintiff to cite "...all the evidence in the record that would support the 
determination reached by the trial court and then demonstrate why, even when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the court below, it is insufficient to support the finding 
under attack." Interiors Contracting. Inc. v. Smith. Halander & Smith Associates. 881 
P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 1994) (Citations Omitted). In contravention of her obligation 
to marshal all evidence in support of the disputed findings, Plaintiff superficially 
provides limited testimony and evidence which only serves to support her own 
arguments while conveniently omitting the overwhelming evidence to support the 
District Court's findings. Petitioner's assertion that there was no evidence presented at 
trial concerning the stipulated and undisputed status of the recorded title to the Home 
upon the death of Defendant's wife, not only fails to acknowledge the stipulation of the 
parties, but also fails to address the overwhelming evidence of the existence of the joint 
tenancy between Defendant and his wife, including the fact that the existence of the 
deeds and the recorded title they conveyed were never objected to by the Plaintiff. 
As was stipulated by the parties and decided by a prior court, the title to 
the home was held by Defendant and his wife as joint tenants at the time of her death. 
(R. 76, 941, 1499, 1522) Asserting the stipulation of the parties for the record, 
Defendant's counsel states without objection as follows: 
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As far as the joint tenancy, the title of the deed [Quit Claim Deed dated 
March 10, 1989] as stipulated by counsel, was in joint tenancy at her 
death. Nothing evidences the intent of the decedent more than the deed. 
The deed is not ambiguous on its face. The deed is clear and it evidences 
her intent to transfer that property to her husband upon death. 
Even Plaintiff Griffiths' counsel acknowledges the existence of the deed 
and the joint tenancy in his attempted use of a partnership theory and a common law 
"four unities" argument to sever the joint tenancy during the following discussion with 
the Court: 
Mr. Shapiro: I'm going to object, your Honor. The only issue before the 
Court is a real property determination and whether a joint tenancy deed is 
effective or not. I'm having a hard time with the relevancy of her living 
quarters and when she lived in that. It lacks foundation. 
Mr. Bybee: We would proffer that the intent here is to show that there 
was not the four elements necessary to pre-joint tenancy. That Mrs. 
Howes, in other words, was living there alone and that Leo was not a 
resident of that house. 
Mr. Shapiro: When has that become an element of joint tenancy? 
Mr. Bybee: Ever since I was in law school. 
The Court: The issue is whether or not it is, as I understand it, is 
whether or not, number one, it's a partnership, the house is an asset in a 
partnership between Mr. Griffiths-
Mr. Bybee: Greg Griffiths. 
The Court: -and the deceased, or whether there is a true joint tenancy; is 
that correct? 
Mr. Bybee: That's correct. 
The Court: Well, I don't know whether he lived there or not; is that 
relevant? 
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Mr. Bybee: Yes, your Honor. We think it is because we think that is 
one of the elements, in order to create a joint tenancy is that there must be 
four elements of joint unity or joint use of the property. One of those is 
that in this case, Leo is claiming that he has lived there with her almost 
continuously, and we think the testimony of this witness would be— 
The Court: I am not sure that the living there is an element of joint 
tenancy. I don't think the law would support that. It may have some 
relevance to the intent of the parties, though, would it not? And that 
would be for the Court to decide how much weight that has. 
Mr. Shapiro: Intent of the parties, excuse me. 
The Court: Whether it's a joint tenancy or partnership? 
Mr. Shapiro: Possibly I guess, your Honor. 
The Court: And that's the issue here is the intent of the parties, because 
we have a deed; correct? 
Mr. Shapiro: We have a deed. 
Mr. Bybee: That's correct. 
The Court: It says joint tenancy. 
Mr. Shapiro: Right. And trying to go behind that deed and show the 
attendant [intended] party was really a partnership and we also want to 
inform you of the parole evidence rule. We all know about the case that 
you decided2, your Honor, concerning that issue, that intrinsic [extrinsic] 
evidence is not permissible unless there is a coercion or fraud, mistake or 
this kind of thing, and it was ruled on by the appellate court. We feel like 
this is outside of the scope of the four corners of the document because it 
was an [unambiguous document, and if they want to show fraud, 
coercion and those types of things, intrinsic evidence is admissible in 
Court to address those issues. 
The Court: Or mistake. 
2
 Referring to West One Trust Co. v. Morrison. 861 P.2d 1058 (Utah App. 1993) 
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Mr. Shapiro: Mutual mistake and those types of arguments. 
The Court: I'll allow it. Go ahead. 
(R. 1082:23-1085:8) 
The deed establishing the joint tenancy between Defendant and his wife 
and their joint tenancy was also acknowledged on the record again by Plaintiff Griffiths' 
counsel as follows: 
Mr. Shapiro: Another transfer after this, your Honor, where the property 
went from Mr. Howes and the decedent to Mr. Howes and the decedent. 
Mr. Bybee: As joint tenants. 
Mr. Shapiro: Yes. After 1988. 
The Court: And that was after 1988? Okay. 
(R. 1431:4-1431:10) 
Acknowledging the Court's judicial notice of the 1988 Quit Claim Deed, 
Plaintiff Griffiths' counsel questions Defendant as follows: 
Mr. Bybee: When the deed was made out-- the third deed [Quit Claim 
Deed dated March 10, 1989] that the court has referred to and just 
between you and Catherine, she insisted that her name be first on that 
deed didn't she? 
Mr. Howes: Her name first? 
Mr. Bybee: Yes. She insisted upon you putting her name first and your 
name second. That's true, isn't it? 
Mr. Howes: Well, I wasn't aware that it made any difference. 
(R 1499:10-1499:18) 
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Plaintiffs limited marshaling of evidence fails to even address her own 
presentation and acknowledgment of the joint tenancy at trial when she makes the same 
"four unities" argument currently asserted in her appellate brief as follows: 
And I believe that the deed that shows a joint tenancy could not stand the 
legal sufficiency test of a joint tenancy case including the Common Law 
rule of the four unities; according to the legal definition of a tenancy-in-
common as well as a joint tenancy. 
I believe that if the court looked towards just that deed alone and the fact 
that there are other interests in this property, that it was never equal and 
undivided. There were other interests also in this property, which would 
also make it a tenancy-in-common rather than a joint tenancy. Just 
because you call something that's black and white, and walks on four legs 
a cat; if it smells it means it's a skunk. So, I would submit to the court 
that I believe that this could not stand the legal sufficiency of a joint 
tenancy. No control, no possession, title or interest in the property. 
(1518:21-1519:10) 
Addressing the Quit Claim Deed dated March 10, 1988, to the court 
Plaintiff Griffiths' counsel further acknowledges the deed as follows: "Catherine acting 
under some assumption that having her name first is going to somehow protect her or 
outlive Leo, lets him talk her into putting him on as a joint tenant in a later deed." 
(1522:14-1522:17) 
Conveniently, Plaintiff also fails to discuss Plaintiff Griffiths' own 
affidavit which was admitted as Trial exhibit 82, which states in paragraph 4 as follows: 
"C. Leo Howes and Catherine Howes were joint tenants on the Deed at the time of her 
death." (R. 1333, Trial Exhibit 82) (Addendum #5) 
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Plaintiffs marshaling also fails to discuss the fact that on November 17, 
1993, this Court reserved its decision on Plaintiffs Petition to Set Aside Joint Tenancy 
and Demand That Property not Be Sold which was based on the existence of the joint 
tenancy and the March 10, 1989, Quit Claim Deed for trial. (R. 387-389) Plaintiff 
placed the acknowledged March 10, 1989 Quit Claim Deed and the joint tenancy at 
issue before the lower court by filing her Petition to Set Aside Joint Tenancy and 
Demand That Property not Be Sold. (R. 323-346) Defendant's opposition to her 
Petition also incorporated the March 10, 1989 Quit Claim Deed and joint tenancy, 
including other undisputed Statement of Facts from his Memorandum m Opposition to 
all Pending Motions, Petitions, or Other Matters Currently Pending filed on September 
28, 1993, before the trial court for its decision at trial. (R. 353-358, 285-315) 
As Defendant's opposition memorandum undisputedly states: "Clinton 
Leo Howes is the vested fee title owner of the subject property." (R. 356) If Plaintiff 
wasn't acknowledging that the March 10, 1989 Quit Claim Deed and joint tenancy were 
properly before the lower court as reserved in the lower court's November 17, 1993, 
Order (R. 387- 389); why was Plaintiff attempting to sever the joint tenancy which was 
created by it? 
In addition, why did Plaintiff fail to appeal Judge Young's Finding of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in the civil suit filled under Civil # 930900838 CV which 
found that the subject Home was held between Defendant and his wife as joint tenants at 
the time of her death. (R. 75-78) Particularly, Judge Young found as follows: "At the 
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time of Ms. Howes' death, the subject home was held by Clinton Leo Howes and the 
deceased, as joint tenants." (R. 76 Finding #3) 
Furthermore, it is important to note that Plaintiff never objected to the 
now disputed findings numbers 9, 10, and 38, post trial nor did she object to the 
existence of the March 10, 1989, Quit Claim Deed during or after the trial until the 
filing of her appellate brief. The exact findings that Plaintiff now disputes were 
contained in the initial proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law delivered to 
Plaintiff on September 30,1994. (Addendum #1 Findings # 9,10, 39) Plaintiffs 
objection to the proposed findings makes specific objections and arguments as to the 
evidence supporting other findings, but is devoid of a single objection or argument as to 
the exact same final findings entered on November 21, 1994, that Plaintiff now disputes 
on appeal. (R. 664-675 Findings #9, 10, 38) 
What is extremely deceptive in the way Plaintiff fails to marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the lower court's findings is the fact that Plaintiffs own Petition 
for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order filed in the Supreme Court admits 
that the March 10, 1989, Quit Claim Deed and the joint tenancy it created was properly 
before the lower court. Paragraph 4 of her Petition to Appeal states as follows: 
The Decedent was married to C. Leo Howes, the Defendant, in name 
only, but a signature was required as a matter of habit by the bank to 
secure the SBA loan, so a Quit Claim Deed was executed between the 
Decedent and Howes, which included the terms 'joint tenancy'. 
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(Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order on file with Court of 
Appeals) 
Furthermore, on page 7 of Petitioner's Petition for Permission to Appeal 
from an Interlocutory Order, Petitioner states and represents to the Supreme Court as 
follows: "All exhibits attached hereto demonstrate that the questions were properly 
raised in the trial court and ruled upon." Exhibit H to the Petition is the exact March 
10, 1989, Quit Claim Deed to which Plaintiff in her brief for the first time on appeal 
and before the Appellate Court is asserting was improperly utilized by the trial court in 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Petition for Permission to Appeal from 
an Interlocutory Order on file with Court of Appeals) 
Perhaps even more egregious is the fact that Plaintiff's present brief 
contradicts her Docketing Statement filed with this Court on or about April 5, 1995. 
Plaintiff acknowledges in her Docketing Statement that the March 10, 1989, Quit 
Claim Deed was properly before the lower court. Page 4, Paragraph H of her 
Docketing Statement of Facts asserts as follows: "On March 10, 1989, at the request of 
the SB A lender, Decedent and Howes executed a Quit Claim Deed from themselves as 
Grantors to themselves as Grantees as joint tenants." (Docketing Statement on file with 
Court of Appeals.) 
Furthermore, a review of the Issues for Review and Standards of Review 
contained in Plaintiffs Docketing Statement establishes that Plaintiff didn't dispute that 
the March 10,1989, Quit Claim Deed was properly before the lower court. Plaintiffs 
15 
issues on appeal contained in the statement rely upon the admission and utilization of the 
Quit Claim Deed by the lower court to assert her convoluted and erroneous common 
law "Four Unities" argument, not the assertion that the deed was not properly before 
the trial court. (Docketing Statement on file with Court of Appeals.) 
Plaintiff cannot prevail on her challenge to the lower court's findings 
because she has not only failed to marshal all of the evidence before the lower court, 
but has also failed to demonstrate that any of the disputed findings are clearly erroneous 
even if it is assumed arguendo, that she did marshal all of the evidence before the lower 
court. See, Consolidation Coal Co. v. Division of State Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d 
514,519 (Utah 1994); Campbell v. Campbell. 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah App.1995). 
The Plaintiff merely utilized selective and favorable excerpts from the appeal record to 
buttress her argument while failing to present in a "...fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 
1991); accord Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. Inc.. 872 P.2d 
1051,1053 (Utah App. 1994). 
Even if any of Plaintiffs selective highlights of the record could be 
considered marshaling, the Plaintiff has also failed to show in a light favorable to the 
trial court's findings that any of the disputed findings are not supported by the evidence 
before the lower court or that they were clearly erroneous. 
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II 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN OF SEVERING THE 
JOINT TENANCY. 
Plaintiffs's attempt to raise a lack of "four unities" argument concerning 
the joint tenancy is without merit. As is established by Plaintiffs filings before this 
Court and the record as cited above, the parties have never disputed the execution of 
deeds nor the recorded status of the title at the time of Defendant's wife's death. The 
existence of the recorded Quit Claim Deed executed on March 10, 1989, where 
Defendant and his wife transferred the subject Home to themselves as joint tenants, and 
the recorded title effect thereof was never disputed by Plaintiff before the lower court or 
for that matter, in the Appellate Court until the filing of her most recent brief. 
Specifically, the deed in question contained the following language: "C. Leo Howes 
and M. Catherine Howes, Grantor of Salt Lake County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
hereby quit claim to M. Catherine Howes and C. Leo Howes, husband and wife, as 
joint tenants." (Addendum #4) 
Plaintiff asserts a convoluted argument alleging that the joint tenancy 
established by the March 10, 1989, Quit Claim Deed was severed because of a failure 
of the common law four unities title theory. Not only does Plaintiff fail to marshal any 
evidence supporting the Court's findings with respect to the joint tenancy between 
Defendant and his wife, but she has also failed to even provide any support that her 
argument has any legal or factual support in the instant case. In fact the mere assertion 
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of the argument in and of itself establishes that Defendant admits there was a joint 
tenancy between Defendant and his wife which required an attack in order to sever it. 
The requirements concerning the four unities of title have been replaced 
by statutory law. UCA §57-1-5 (1973) replaced the common law principal concerning 
the four unities as follows: 
A sole owner of real property shall create a joint tenancy in himself and 
another or others by making a transfer to himself and such other or others 
as joint tenants by use of such words as 'herein provided' or by conveying 
to another person or persons an interest in land in which an interest is 
retained by the Grantor and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by 
use of such words as 'herein provided'. In all cases, the interest of joint 
tenants must be equal and undivided." 
Plaintiff relies on the case of Larsen v. Paynes. 122 P.2d 429 (Utah 
1943) to assert her severance by unity failure theory. This case was decided 30 years 
prior to the enactment of the statute referenced above. Not only has the requirement of 
the four unities been replaced by statute, but her interpretation thereof is erroneous. 
The Plaintiff appears to be asserting that she was able to prove that Defendant did not 
live in the house and therefore the unity of possession was broken. Not only did 
Plaintiff fail to prove this fact or marshal the evidence that established he did not live in 
the home, but she fails to address the fact that it does not matter where the joint tenant 
lives because living in one's home is not a requirement for the creation of, or in 
Plaintiffs case, the severance of a joint tenancy. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff fails to even address the fact that she failed to 
meet her burden of attacking the joint tenancy, even assuming arguendo that she did 
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marshal all of the evidence to support the court's disputed findings. As Plaintiff asserts 
in her brief the lower court reserved her Petition to Set Aside Joint Tenancy and 
Demand That Property Not Be Sold for trial. (R. 338) Plaintiff's petition to severe the 
joint tenancy further acknowledges the existence of the joint tenancy between Defendant 
and his wife because it contains Plaintiff's attempt to attack or sever the acknowledged 
joint tenancy. The Plaintiff had the burden of challenging the validity of the joint 
tenancy by clear and convincing evidence which she failed to do. See Spader v. 
Newbold, 511 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah 1973); See also Pagano v. Walker. 539 P.2d 452, 
454 (Utah 1975) (A joint tenancy is 'subject to attack only on the same basis as any 
other written agreement or contract, by showing that because of fraud, duress, undue 
influence, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity that in equity and good conscience it 
should not be enforced.') (Citations omitted.) 
As the Court clearly found, Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to establish 
that the joint tenancy did not operate to transfer title of Defendant's home to himself at 
the time of Defendant's wife's death. 
Ill 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT RAISE ISSUES IN HER APPELLATE BRIEF 
WHICH WERE NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT OR PRESERVED FOR 
APPEAL. 
URCP 24(a)(5) requires an Appellant to show with citations to the record 
how an issue was preserved for appeal. Plaintiff's brief contains a new issue 
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concerning the delivery and existence of the March 10, 1989, Quit Claim Deed which 
she not only failed to raise at the trial level but until the filing of her appellate brief on 
April 1, 1996, was never raised before either the Supreme Court or this Court in her 
appellate documents. 
In fact, Plaintiffs Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory 
Order and her Docketing Statement before this Court are based upon the assertion that 
the Quit Claim Deed of March 10, 1989, and the joint tenancy that it created were 
properly before the trial court. Not only does Plaintiff cite to the Quit Claim Deed and 
joint tenancy but she includes the deed as an exhibit to her appeal petition. (Petition for 
Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order and Docketing Statement on file with 
the Court of Appeals.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs litigation at trial was limited to an 
attack and severance of the joint tenancy, not to the existence thereof. 
To preserve an issue for appeal, it must have been properly raise and 
litigated before the trial court. As the clear weight of the evidence as discussed above 
establishes, the question before the trial court was never the existence, execution and 
recording of the deeds giving rise to the established and stipulated to joint tenancy, but 
to Plaintiffs attempts to attack or sever the joint tenancy. The Plaintiff, until her 
present brief, has neither raised nor litigated an issue with respect to the record status of 
the title when Defendant's wife died. Because Plaintiff failed to raise and litigate issues 
concerning the existence of the Quit Claim Deed and the joint tenancy it created, she 
has waived her right to present the issue to this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff has failed to marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial 
court's Findings of Fact numbers 9, 10, and 38. Furthermore, she has failed to show in 
a light favorable to the trial court's findings that the disputed findings are not supported 
by the evidence before the lower court. Even if Plaintiff's selective references to the 
record could even be considered marshaling, she still has failed to meet her burden to 
attack or sever the joint tenancy as is clearly supported by not only the disputed 
findings, but by the undisputed findings as well. 
The lower court exerted great effort into reviewing, understanding, and 
ruling upon Plaintiff's often disjointed and convoluted attempt to attack and sever the 
joint tenancy that existed between Defendant and his wife. The trial court had a 
thorough understanding of the legal theories necessary to set aside a transfer by 
operation of law to a surviving joint tenant. A review of the evidence in the record 
before the trial court, without question, supports the adequacy and correctness of its 
findings and the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's 
findings. 
DATED this 6 day of May, 1996. 
BRUCE H. SHAPIRO, P.C. 
Bruce H. Shapiro £/ 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of May, 1996, I mailed by first class 
mail, postage prepaid, two (2) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the 
following: 
Wendell P. Abies 
255 East 400 South, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lynn Poulsen, Pro Se 
3353 South Main Street, Suite 227 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
Bruce H. Shapiro (Bar No. 4761) 
BRUCE H. SHAPIRO, P.C. 
3760 S. Highland Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 273-3314 
Jeffrey W. Wilkinson (Bar No. 3754) 
JEFFREY W. WILKINSON, P.C. 
3760 S. Highland Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: 273-3909 
Attorneys for Clinton Leo Howes 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
MARION CATHERINE HOWES, ) 
) Civil No. 933900381 ES 
Decedent. ) 
) Judge Noel 
The above-captioned matter came on for trial on April 26, May 11, and June 
15, 1994. Respondent, Clinton Leo Howes ("Defendant") was represented by his 
attorneys Bruce H. Shapiro and Jeffrey W. Wilkinson, Petitioner Gregory Griffiths was 
represented by his attorney Don By bee, and Petitioner Lynn Poulsen was representing 
herself pro se (collectively "Plaintiffs"). After having heard the testimony of the 
respective parties and witnesses, together with the introduction of various exhibits, the 
court hereby makes the following: 
n i F nnpv 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The property which is the subject of this trial is located at 5160 S. 
Highland Drive, Holladay, Utah, which is more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point on the West line of Highland Drive, 
said point being North 1335.05 feet and West 198.22 feet from 
the Southeast corner of Section 9, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
89°55' West 154.28 feet; thence North 01°32'20" East 114.97 
feet; thence North 6°38' East 69.73 feet; thence South 
89°29'10" East 45.51 feet; thence South S3°36'00" East 
102.91 feet to the West line of Highland Drive; thence South 
1°32'20" West 172.59 feet along said line to point of 
BEGINNING. 
2. The property consists of land and a home. 
3. Since in or about 1984 the subject home has also been used as a 
wedding reception center doing business under the name Stevenson House. 
4. On September 22, 1992, Catherine Howes passed away in the home 
located at 5160 S. Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
5. At the time of her death Catharine Howes was married to Clinton Leo 
Howes. 
6. Catherine Howes used different names during her lifetime which 
included Marion Catherine Griffiths, Marion K. Griffiths, M. Catherine Howes, and M. 
Katherine Howes, all of which refer to the Decedent. 
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7. In June of 1978, the decedent, Marion Catherine Griffiths, and 
Clinton Leo Howes, husband and wife, conveyed the property to Clinton Howes and 
Marion K. Griffiths as husband and wife and Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths 
as husband and wife as joint tenants. 
8. On October 11, 1988, Clinton Howes, Marion K. Griffiths, Gregory 
J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths conveyed the property by warranty deed to C. Leo 
Howes and M. Catherine Howes. 
9. On March 10, 1989, C. Leo Howes and M. Katherine Howes 
conveyed the property to themselves, C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes, as joint 
tenants. 
10. At the time of Catherine Howes' death, title to the property was held 
in the name of C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes as joint tenants. 
11. The parties have stipulated as to the appointment of a personal 
representative and the disposition as to the appointment and issues addressing other matters 
besides the real property and partnership claim are reserved. 
12. The only issue brought before the court in this trial is the treatment of 
the deeds in question, title and disposition of the real property, a partnership claim and the 
extent of Mr. Griffiths' ownership, if any, in the subject real property. 
13. The language of the deed of October 11, 1988, whereupon Clinton 
Howes, Marion K. Griffiths, Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths conveyed the 
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property by warranty deed to C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes is clear and 
unambiguous, and in order for Plaintiffs to attack the deed they must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the deed was entered into by mutual mistake, duress, or undue 
influence. 
14. The Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence nor argued any fraud. 
15. The Plaintiffs have failed to establish by even a preponderance of the 
evidence that the deed of October 11, 1988, was signed by Gregory J. Griffiths, Deborah 
S. Griffiths, or the decedent as a result of duress or undue influence. 
16. The Plaintiffs have failed to establish by even a preponderance of the 
evidence that the deed of March 10, 1989, was signed by the decedent as the result of 
duress or undue influence. 
17. The only evidence presented to this court on the issue of duress or 
undue influence was the disputed testimony that Defendant Clinton Leo Howes refused to 
sign on an SBA loan to improve the premises unless the Gregory and Deborah Griffiths 
were removed from the title on the subject property. 
18. The evidence introduced at trial established that Defendant did not 
make such a demand with respect to the SBA loan, but even if he had this would not be 
sufficient grounds on which to base a claim of undue influence or duress. 
19. The Decedent, in spite of certain eccentricities and idiosyncrasies was 
intelligent, alert, capable of managing her own business affairs, and at all material times 
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could understand banking and business transactions, and was not acting in a diminished 
capacity at the time of execution of the subject deeds. 
20. The evidence presented at trial established that the Decedent "had a 
mind of her own" and was "strong willed" and not subject to the influence of others. 
21. There is no credible evidence that the Decedent, Gregory Griffiths or 
Deborah Griffiths acted under duress or undue influence when they executed the October 
11, 1988, deed. 
22. There is no credible evidence that the Decedent, acted under duress 
or undue influence when she executed the March 10, 1989, deed. 
23. There was no evidence presented to establish that the Decedent had 
any other intent but to transfer the property out of the partnership. 
24. The issue of mistake was not presented to the court in a clear and 
precise manner, but the court reviewed said claim as grounded upon the assertion that the 
Decedent and Mr. Griffiths intended to continue to operate as a partnership after 1988 
when the SBA loan was made and Gregory and Deborah Griffiths transferred their interest 
in the property under the mistaken belief that the deeds would not affect Mr. Griffiths' 
partnership tenancy or interest in the property. 
25. There was no credible evidence presented that the decedent, Gregory 
Griffiths or Deborah Griffiths, acted under either a mutual or unilateral mistake when the 
October 11, 1988 and March 10, 1989 deeds were executed. 
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26. While there was oral testimony that Gregory Griffiths was on the 
premises and seemed to have a hand in the business after October 1988 and up until the 
death of Catherine Howes, there was no testimony presented other than that of Mr. 
Griffiths himself that there was indeed a partnership, and the court finds such testimony 
not credible and without merit. 
27. The oral testimony established that the Decedent had stated to others 
that after the SBA loan in September of 1988, and the payment of $40,000 to Plaintiff 
Griffiths that Mr. Griffiths stated to others that he was now "bought out" and that they 
(Decedent and Mr. Griffiths) were now "even Steven." 
28. The testimony also established that Gregory Griffiths himself had 
reported that he had been bought out of the partnership at about the same time. 
29. The evidence presented at trial established that after 1988 Mr. 
Griffiths was no longer in control of any Stevenson House bank account, and had no 
signing authority, whereas prior to 1988 Mr. Griffiths did have signing authority and 
signed many of the Stevenson House checks. 
30. No evidence was presented at trial to establish that there were any 
partnership records including financial records that would reflect a partnership after 1988. 
31. The evidence presented at trial established that Mr. Griffiths did not 
sign on the SBA loan which was obtained in September of 1988 for improvement of the 
home. 
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32. The evidence presented at trial established that after 1988 Mr. 
Griffiths' tax returns did not show partnership income from the Stevenson House as many 
of his prior tax returns had done. 
33. The evidence presented at trial established that Mr. Griffiths' 1988 
federal income tax return treats the receipt of the $40,000 as proceeds from the sale of the 
subject property, with a taxable gain of $10,452. 
34. Mr. Griffiths' tax treatment of the subject property on his 1988 tax 
return is entirely inconsistent with Mr. Griffiths' claim that $40,000 was repayment to him 
for funds which he had earlier loaned to the partnership. 
35. The evidence presented at trial established that Plaintiffs did not make 
any mortgage payments on the subject property after 1988. 
36. The Stevenson House account whereupon both the Decedent and Mr. 
Griffiths had been signatories was closed in or about November of 1988. 
37. The parties did not intend to continue their partnership after 1988 and 
did not intend that the home would continue after 1988 as partnership property with Greg 
Griffiths as one of the partners. 
38. The court finds that Greg Griffiths' interest in the partnership and in 
the subject property was bought out in 1988, and that any partnership interest which may 
have existed was terminated at that time. 
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39. The property in question was held in joint tenancy between Clinton 
Leo Howes and Marion Catherine Griffiths at the time of her death, and upon her death the 
Decedent's share by operation of law passed to Clinton Leo Howes. 
40. Ownership interest of the property should be quieted insofar as it 
relates to any claim of Plaintiffs. 
41. Defendant is entitled to the subject property free and clear of any and 
all claims of the Plaintiffs. 
42. The Plaintiffs are permanently enjoined from asserting any adverse 
claim to Defendant's title to the real property that is the subject of this suit. 
43. All restraining orders and injunctions previously issued by the court 
should be lifted as against the subject property. 
44. The Lis Pendens recorded by Gregory Griffiths should be released 
and removed from the subject property. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters its 
Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The property which is the subject of this litigation, is located at 5160 S. 
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Highland Drive, Holladay, Utah, which is more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point on the West line of Highland Drive, said 
point being North 1335.05 feet and West 198.22 feet from the 
Southeast corner of Section 9, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 89°55' 
West 154.28 feet; thence North 01°32'20" East 114.97 feet; 
thence North 6°38' East 69.73 feet; thence South 89°29'10" East 
45.51 feet; thence South 83o36'00" East 102.91 feet to the West 
line of Highland Drive; thence South 1°32'20" West 172.59 feet 
along said line to point of BEGINNING. 
2. On September 22, 1992, Catherine Howes passed away in the home 
located at 5160 South Highland Drive, Holladay, Utah. 
3. At the time of her death Catherine Howes was married to Clinton Leo 
Howes. 
4. Catherine Howes used different names during her lifetime which 
included Marion Catherine Griffiths, Marion K. Griffiths, M. Catherine Howes, and M. 
{Catherine Howes, all of which refer to the Decedent. 
5. In June of 1978, the Decedent, Marion Catherine Griffiths, and Clinton 
Howes, husband and wife, conveyed the property to Clinton Howes and Marion K. Griffiths 
as husband and wife and Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths as husband and wife 
as joint tenants. 
6. At the time of Catherine Howes* death, title to the property was held in 
the name of C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes as joint tenants. 
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7. Issues addressing other matters besides the treatment of the deeds in 
question, title and disposition of the real property and partnership claim are reserved for a 
later date. 
8. The deed of October 11, 1988, whereupon Clinton Howes, Marion K. 
Griffiths, Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah S. Griffiths conveyed the property by Warranty 
Deed to C. Leo Howes and M. Catherine Howes is clear and unambiguous. 
9. The Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence nor argued any fraud. 
10. The Plaintiffs have failed to establish by even a preponderance of the 
evidence that the deed of October 11, 1988, was signed by Gregory J. Griffiths and Deborah 
S. Griffiths, or the Decedent, as a result of duress or undue influence. 
11. The Plaintiffs have failed establish by even a preponderance of the 
evidence that the deed of March 10, 1989, was signed by the Decedent as a result of duress or 
undue influence. 
12. The Plaintiffs have failed to establish that either a mutual or unilateral 
mistake occurred when the October 11, 1988 or the March 10, 1989 deeds were executed. 
13. The Decedent was intelligent, alert, capable of managing her own 
business affairs, and at all material times could understand banking and business transactions, 
and was in no way acting in a diminished capacity at the time of execution of the subject 
deeds. 
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14. The Plaintiff, Gregory Griffiths, was bought out of the partnership and 
the real property in 1988, and any partnership interest that may have existed was terminated 
at this time. 
15. The property in question was held in joint tenancy between Clinton Leo 
Howes and Marion Catherine Griffiths at the time of her death. Upon her death the 
Decedent's share by operation of law passed to Clinton Leo Howes. 
16. Ownership interest of the property is quieted in so far as it relates to any 
claim of Plaintiffs. 
17. Defendant, Clinton Leo Howes, is entitled to the real property free and 
clear of any and all claims of the Plaintiffs. 
18. The Plaintiffs are permanently enjoined from asserting any adverse claim 
to Defendant's title of the real property referenced above. 
19. All restraining orders and injunctions previously issued by this court 
shall be lifted as against the subject property. 
20. The Lis Pendens recorded by Gregory Griffiths shall be released and 
removed from the subject property. 
DATED this day of October, 1994. 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of September, 1994, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was hand delivered to: 
Jennie Lynn Poulsen 
3353 South Main, #227 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Don Bybee 
Attorney at Law 
2805 S. State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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3131476 WARRANTY DEED 
MARION K. CRIFFITHS and CLINTON HOWES, wife and huaband grantors 
of S a l t Lake City , County of Sa l t U k e , State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to CLINTON HOWES and MARION K. CRIFFITHS, husband nnd w i f e ; 
mid GREGORY J . CRIFFITHS and DEBORAH S. CRIFFITHS, huaband and w i f e , oa Jo in t tenancy, 
and not oa tcnnnto In common, with fu l l r i g h t a of au rv lvo rah lp . 
grantee a 
of Sn l t Lnke C i ty , County of Sa l t Lake, S c t t ^ ' o f Utah for the sum of 
TEN AND NO/100 ($10.00) and other good and Valuable, c o n s i d e r a t i o n DOLLARS, 
the following described tract 
State of Utah: 
of land In Sal t Lake County, 
Beginning a t a point on the Weat l i ne of Highland Drive, sntd poin t being North 
1333.05 fee t and Weat 198.22 feet from the SouthenBt corner of Sec t ion 9, Township 
2 South, Kongo I Eas t , S a t l Lake Haae and Meridian, and running thence North 89°55' 
Went 15A.28 f e e t ; thence North O l ^ ^ O " East 114.97 f e e t ; thence North 6°38 l East 
69.73 f e e t ; thence South 89°29 ,10M Eaat 45.51 f e e t ; thence South 83°36'00M Eoat 102 J9J1 
fee t to the Weat l i n e of Highland Drive; thence South 1°32 '20" West 172.59 feet 
a long sa id l i n e t o poiv»t o( beginning. 
Subject to easements, r e s t r i c t i o n s , and r i g h t s of wny appearing of record or 
en fo rceab le in lav or equ i ty and general property taxca for the yenr 1978 and 
t h e r e a f t e r . 
WITNESS, the hand a of said grantors , this 29th 
June , A. D. 19 78 
Signed in the Prosecco of 
day of 
, * STATE 0>W^AH, \ 
/ \ f i t . 
.. Couifty yf Salts Lnke J 
.••*<>x-. :,;'/ \ 
/ N ^ J ^ ' W A'pV ? 9 t h day of June , A. D. 19 78 
;
 • / f>^oj \AU^ppcarod before mo MARION K. CRIFFITHS and CLINTON HOWF.S, husband and wtfe 
* \ \ t . v. '." : l 
\ thVMgncY;«i of/ l is within Instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the 
""rZ.i'*-' 
My commission pxpfrp* *T"~ Sf~ vf 
/ ' Notary Public. 
Jliildlnv In S a U U k « C l t ? » U c " h 
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ADDENDUM NO. 4 
Recorded at ^.aquctt of „ 
at ..... M. Fsc ?*ki > 
by Dtp. Book Pt#» R*f,:...._ 
Mail tax notice to .. Addrctf _ 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
C. Leo 1 love a and M. fathertne How i s grantor 
of aa l t Lake , County of Salt Lake , Stat* ot Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLMM to 
M. Catherine Hove* and C. Leo Howes,, husband and wire, a* j o i n t tenants 
grantee 
of Sal t Lake for the sum of 
Ten Dollars aad 0G7100************************** DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land In Sa l t l**kt C m n l / , 
State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point on the Veat l i n e of Highland Orive, said point being North 
l?35.05 feet ar.d West 198.22 fee t from the Southeast corner of <?<. t i on 9, 
T. wnaltip 2 Souch, Range l East, Sal* Lake Base ani Meridian, and 'un-ilng 
tnence North 89*55* Weat 154.28 f e e t ; thence North 0 r 3 2 ' 2 0 " East 114.97 f e e t ; 
thence North 6*38* East 69.73 f e e t ; thence South 89*29 ,10H East 45.51 f e e t ; 
thence South 33#36'00M East 102.91 f e e t to the West l i n e of Highland Drive; 
thence South 1*32*20" Weot 172.5S f e e t along said l i n e to point of beginning. 
A 15 flARCM 39 10:57 Ml 
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\ RECOROCRr SALT LAKE C0»VTY# W 
GUAR01AH T l i t f 
R£C ST: REBECCA €f:AT , OtTUI 
VrrHK* the hand of said grantor , thu day of 
, A D. on* thousand nine hundred and 
Signed in the pnaenca 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
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ADDENDUM NO. 5 
JENNIE LYNN POULSEN 
3353 South Main #227 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
GREGORY GRIFFITHS 
1375 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ny 
ThindJudidalOlstrict 
mi
 m 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JENNIE LYNN POULSEN 
and 
GREGORY GRIFFITHS 
Plaintiffs' 
vs. 
CLINTON LEO HOWES, 
Defendant. 
COUNTER AFFIDAVIT 
OF GREGORY GRIFFITHS 
TO C. LEO HOWES'S 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
Civil No. 930900838 CV 
Judge David S. Young 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I Gregory Griffiths do depose and states and represents to 
the court as follows: 
1. The Defendant was married to Catherine Howes. 
2. On September 22, 1992 Catherine Howes passed away at her 
home located at 5160 Highland Drive,Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. The wedding business known as "Stevenson House'1 operated 
(and is still operating) at 5160 Highland Drive. Marion Catherine 
Howes was the sole owner of the Stevenson House business at the time 
of her death. 
4. C. Leo Howes and Catherine Howes were joint tenants on 
the deed at the time of her death. 
5. Plaintiff, Gregory Griffiths helped pay for the mortgage 
of the nrnnprtv at 5160 Highland Drive before his mother Marion 
Gregory Griffiths also paid mortgage payments durring the 
marriage of Marion Catherine Howes to her husband. Gregory Griffiths 
and his wife Deborah Griffiths were also on the deed prior to the 
present deed in place at the time of the Decedent's death. 
Gregory Griffiths was coersed iuto signing a quit claim deed 
of he and his wife's interest in the property in exchange for a 
payout of monies and goods-he had provided for the running and operating 
of a wedding business known as "Stevenson House". 
He was threatended by the Defendant and the deceased that if 
he and his wife did not 3ign they would not pay him what her was due. 
This payment did not reflect the monies he had invested in the 
property over the years in the form of mortgage payments, or the improvements 
he made on the property, or interest charged on monies he had invested 
into the propertyf & *t^Ll\fcj ft<? / W £ VC^€(i lt\ fa bU^/'lKf^f . 
6. The Defendant brought minimal property into the estate 
during the course of their marriage. This consisted of a Brown 
Naugahyde sofa, love seat, chair, coffee table and end table, a desk 
and a small bed. All other property items in the house were acquired 
by the Plaintiff and his mother. 
The deceased acquired the cat and exclusively named it "Tuxedo". 
Currently the cat has been put out of the house in a small cage inside a 
storage area due to the request of his present new wife. 
I cannot confirm his testimony of receiving no monies for the cat. 
2 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
3. Documents and information will be provided during the discovery 
phase of the litigation. 
9. Based on the above information and due to the fact the 
Defendant's reply was not timely the Plaintiff requests that the court 
Strike the Defendant's testimony. 
Grant the Plaintiff's Default Judgement. 
Award Plaintiffs' all costs incurred in bringing this action. 
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